Post-war European Integration is a succession of regime changes: customs union in the 1960s, Single Market and EMU in the 1990s and EU enlargement in the 2000s. Since 1995 Austria as an EU member takes part in the deepening of EU integration (Single Market, EMU and Monetary Union) and participates in the enlargement process of the EU. Around the years 2014-15 Austria celebrates several anniversaries: 25 years of the fall of the Iron Curtain and hence expansion of new market opportunities through the opening-up of Eastern Europe, 20 years of EU and 15 years of EMU, 10 years since the start of the EU enlargement towards Eastern Europe. With the Croatian accession in 2013, the EU now counts 28 member countries. In order to capture the effects of the last 25 years of Austria's integration into Europe, an integration model for Austria is estimated. It is able to reproduce the main integration effects theoretically expected from the regime changes since 1989. In this respect, the Austrian integration model could also serve as a prototype for other EU countries. Overall, the participating in all integration steps since 1989 has added about 1% to Austria's real GDP per year. In order to capture the integration effects of the last 25 years of Austria's integration into Europe, an integration model for Austria is estimated. It is able to reproduce the main integration effects theoretically expected from the regime changes since 1989. In this respect, the Austrian integration model could also serve as a prototype for other EU members states. Overall, the participating in all integration steps since 1989 has added about 1% to Austria's real GDP per year.
The dream of a GUT of EU
After this first round of European Integration dealing primarily with the elimination of tariffs and hence creating free trade between member states of the EC and EFTA via the creation of a customs union and a free trade area, the integration policy took a long break.
Only about twenty years later the second round of European integration led to a real deepening of the EU integration (Single Market project in 1993 and Economic and Monetary
Union ( Economic Governance structure (see Breuss, 2013A, 2013B) .
In the 21 st century, European Integration reached already a very complex stage. In the "customs union" times in the sixties only the impact of tariff reduction on foreign trade stood in the focus of integration research (see Viner, 1950 and many others). The qualitative jump in European Integration took place when the EU evolved from a pure customs union into the Single Market and the EMU with the euro. The complexity of this important regime changes implied also a much greater challenge for theoretical and empirical integration research than before (see Breuss, 2003A, 2006 Jovanovic, 2011; Badinger and Breuss, 2011) . This econometrically estimated small integration model for Austria could also serve as a prototype model for other member states of the EU.
European Integration: complex reality vs simple theory
The theory of integration has a long tradition. It developed partly ahead of the respective integration moves in Europe (e.g., the theory of customs union by Viner 3 in 1950; see also Kennan and Riezman, 1990) , and partly accompanied the steps towards deeper integration (Single Market, EMU and EU enlargement). While the theoretical explanation of customs union effects (trade creation via enlargement of the integration area, trade diversion due to intensification of intra-area trade at the expense of trade with third countries) is relatively straightforward, complexity increases with integration becoming closer.
3 For an overview, see Jovanovic (2011) and Breuss (2012).
The dream of a GUT of EU Integration and its limits
Due to the complexity of EU's integration (from customs union to Single Market and EMU) one dreams of finding a "Grand Unified Theory" (GUT) of European integration like in theoretical physics. In the case of regional economic integration, Baldwin and Venables (1995) stylized such a GUT for the case of a (fictitious) country entering a regional integration agreement (RIA) and by Kohler (2004) for the case of an incumbent country (Germany) if the EU is enlarging. In the following we evaluate how much one can derive from such a GUT in the case of a small country (Austria) joining the EU. Baldwin and Venables (1995, p. 1691) suppose an approach of an integration GUT which encompasses the main elements connected with the formation of a customs union and some elements of the Single Market project. However, it leaves out many aspects (like factor movements and the political aspects of EMU).
Based on the proposition of Baldwin and Venables (1995) 
A GUT of enlargement (e.g. the EU accession of a new country) should be able to explain at least three major effects of regional integration: allocation of resources (static "trade effects", "scale effects"), accumulation or growth effects and location effects 4 inclusive factor movements. Equation (1) Baldwin and Venables (1995, pp. 1616 ff.) in the context of the insights of models of "economic geography", pioneered by Krugman (1991) . This model category also considers factor movements from one location to the other, from the "periphery" to the "centre" or vice versa. 5 Baldwin and Venables (1995 , pp 1604 -1605 ) discuss in the context of an RIA with "large" countries the case of three countries, in which countries 1 and 2 form the RIA and country 3 remains outside. The members of the RIA can influence the terms of trade, and hence, the third term of equation (1) becomes relevant. The theoretical analysis of three-country problems (with three goods) becomes easily intractable or delivers ambiguous results (Lloyd, 1982) . The Kemp-Wan theorem (Kemp and Wan, 1976) gives a powerful and beautiful answer to the question what configuration of trade policy (towards non-members) would result in a necessarily welfare improving CU. The Kemp-Wan theorem gained further attraction in alternative interpretations (Richardson, 1995) and extensions of free trade areas (Ohyama, 2004; Bond et al., 2004 Baldwin, 2006; Badinger, 2012; McKinsey Germany, 2012 increase productivity particularly in EU firms which participate in additional trade with the USA and hence increase also productivity on average and hence increases real GDP and leads also to the creation of jobs. Productivity increase leads to more competition and hence lower prices. This latter channel from more export engagement to higher total factor 7
Other model simulations -with GTAP-based CGE models -like those of Francois et al (2013, p.46) produce smaller welfare gains of a TTIP. Accordingly, the estimated impact on GDP for the EU and US range only between 0.2 and 0.5 per cent, for the less ambitious and ambitious scenarios respectively. 8 The dispute over the proper implementation of the "Bilateral Investment Treaties" (BITs) paused the TTIP negations. Disputes on international investments are presently ruled by The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in Washington. 9 The essence of the "New" New Trade Theory is the insight that only the most productive firms are active in foreign trade (see Melitz, 2003; Melitz, Helpman and Yeaple, 2004; Melitz, Mayer, Ottaviano, 2014; Melitz and Redding, 2014; Helpman, 2006) . productivity (TFP) and hence higher real GDP is also included in our prototype integration model for Austria.
ii) "Scale and productivity effects" of EU's Single Market:
The three terms in the second row capture theoretical predictions of models with increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition. The first term is the "output" effect, arising if there is a change in output in industries where price differs from average cost. The second term is the "scale" effect, which gives the value of changes in average costs induced by changes in firm scale 10 . The third terms gives "variety" effects which may arise when the number of differentiated consumer products changes, like in trade models with Dixit-Stiglitz type utility functions and ingredients of the theory of monopolistic competition (Grossman and Helpman, 1991) .
Besides the "New Trade Theory" with increasing returns and imperfect competition (Helpman and Krugman, 1985) , in the "New" New Trade Theory, initiated by Melitz (2003) productivity and exports are linked on a micro-firm level basis: the more productive a firm, the more it will engage in export business.
iii) "Accumulation or growth effects" of EU's Single Market: The term in the third row
captures what is also called the "growth" effect of regional integration. It implies that a change in investment is instantaneously costly, but it also augments the capital stock with a social rate of return r . Discounting this at a social discount rate  gives the present value
, and a change in investment has a first-order welfare effect if this ratio differs from one. However, the growth effects of participating in EU's Single Market is captured by equation (1) only rudimentarily. Many feed-back stimuli -from more competition and more research and development (R&D) on productivity and hence GDP growth -should also be implemented in a real GUT of economic integration. Labour migration leads to a welfare loss ("migration loss") in the sender country and to a welfare gain ("immigration surplus") in the recipient country (the old EU member states).
In the context of equation (1) 
Theory-based expectations from EU Integration
Over the last decades, European integration has systematically progressed from a customs union (completed in 1968) towards the Single Market, EMU and the big EU enlargements. Programme. There are other effects deriving from the implementation of the Common 11 For an overview of respective theoretical approaches for EMU, see Breuss (2006) .
Agricultural Policy (CAP), the common foreign trade policy (as a consequence of the customs union and the dismantling of border controls) and the harmonisation of other policies like regional or structural policy. There is also the EU budget which finances the different policy areas with a view to the aspect of solidarity between member countries, implying a redistribution of funds from "rich" EU members (net contributors) to "poor" ones (net recipients). Overall, the Single Market is supposed to boost intra-EU trade and, via gains in efficiency and productivity, lead to stronger economic growth. Across the large number of existing integration studies, Single Market effects are estimated using different methods and approaches: macroeconomic models and/or microeconomic models; for individual countries (country studies with single-country models) and/or for several countries (multi-country models). Among the model approaches there are macro models or general-equilibrium models. Within the modern theory of endogenous growth there are special derivations for the growth effects of integration (see Breuss, 2003A One step more complicated is to capture the integration effects deriving from EU's Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the introduction of the euro as a common currency. In this respect, theory is virtually entering uncharted waters. Relatively well developed is the theory of "optimal currency areas" (OCA) that explores which countries would be in a sustainable position to share a common currency. Early studies arrived at the conclusion that in Europe only a small OCA were able to survive (see Breuss, 2006) . As the current euro-area crisis painfully demonstrates, the project of the euro was driven by political considerations rather than on the basis of economic criteria.
After the fourth round of EU enlargement by Austria, Finland and Sweden, the EU was virtually forced by historical events, i.e., the fall of communism and the Iron Curtain, to an early integration of the former Soviet satellite countries. The countries of East-central Europe were gradually integrated into the EU Single Market (first by Europe Agreements) which, by its larger dimension, offered a greater trade potential.
The effects of the three integration steps, i.e., Single Market, EMU and enlargement, are overlapping which is illustrated in a summary fashion by 
Economic performance within and outside the EU
Of course, the economic performance of a country is not only due to economic integration.
Nevertheless economic integration in those countries where it happened should (theoretically) have added to overall economic growth. In Table 1 The EU Single Market, with its "four freedoms" of goods, services, capital and labour exchange being the core element of European integration. It started on 1 January 1993 and, in conjunction with uniform competition rules, was intended to create a fair common market for about 500 million citizens and 21 million enterprises, thereby giving an impetus to economic growth. The integration and growth effects predicted by a large number of studies have, however, not materialised to full extent for the EU as a whole. In spite of a further deepening of integration through the creation of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) with the euro as a common currency and the EU enlargement as from 2004, the hoped-for stronger momentum of EU growth has failed to materialise. Countries which did not experience such integration moves, like the USA, have as a rule enjoyed higher GDP growth than the EU on aggregate (see Table 1 ).
This "integration puzzle" is difficult to explain. Reasons for the theoretical integration effects not being translated into such in practice may be the still imperfect implementation of the Single Market (e.g., the Services Directive has only entered into force in 2010), the fact that not all EU member countries participate in all integration steps (Europe à la carte or multispeed Europe), or the increase in the EU's internal heterogeneity brought about by the last round of enlargement by mostly "poor" eastern countries. In any case the succession of integration "shocks" might also contribute to explain the "Integration Puzzle" (see Breuss, 2012, p. 47) .
When it was realised that the hoped-for growth stimulus through the creation of the Single Market did not occur, the EU launched in 2000 a new growth strategy under the heading of the "Lisbon Agenda" that was supposed to make the EU within 10 years "the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world". This goal was also not achieved. Meanwhile, all hopes rest on the new growth strategy of "Europe 2020".
A model-based evaluation of Austria's integration into Europe
At the beginning of each integration step, in the EU and in Austria the Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO) and many authors from other institutions (universities, European Commission, etc.) set out to estimate ex-ante the possible integration effects (for an overview of such studies, see Breuss, 2012, p. 43) . In the WIFO studies, simulations were mostly carried out by means of the current version of the WIFO macroeconomic model, adapted for the specific purpose 12 .
The present study proceeds to an ex-post evaluation of integration effects realised over a longer period since the incidence of the respective integration moves. To this end, a dedicated integration model was set up to enable a quantification of possibly all theoretical integration effects referred to above. The integration effects derived in this way represent the deviations of actual economic developments in Austria from a hypothetical path that the economy had followed if Austria had stayed aside of all integration moves since 1989. This integration model for Austria (see Appendix A) could be used as a prototype model for other EU member states to evaluate their integration effects 13 .
Model inputs
We evaluate the integration effects of Austria's European integration with reference to the major variables of the macro model and lastly the impact on real GDP and real GDP per capita is our final "welfare" measure.
The four steps of Austria's deep integration into Europe since 1989 is evaluated in scenarios (see Table 2 ).
Scenario 1: Opening-up of Eastern Europe in 1989
The opening-up of Eastern Europe in 1989 expanded market opportunities for Austria for direct trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) and implied a net inflow of migrants.
Scenario 1 therefore takes into account two effects:
 Trade and FDI effects: In order to capture the trade and FDI effects we introduce a "regime change" variable 14 ("Regime change T+FDI" or the dummy "D_1989_2015" in the integration model of Appendix A) which is one until 1988, then increases by 0.1 in 12 In a comprehensive ex ante study Breuss, Kratena and Schebeck (1994) estimated the potential macroeconomic and sectoral effects of Austria's EU accession with the WIFO macro cum input-output model. Keuschnigg and Kohler (1996) estimated also ex ante the possible Austrian integration effects of EU accession with a single-country dynamic general equilibrium model (sectoral and macroeconomic results). 13 In order to estimate ex post the integration effects of Austria's EU membership in earlier occasions, a similar small country macro model approach was applied (Breuss, 2010A, 2013C) . In the case of a comparison of the integration performance of Austria, Finland and Sweden in the EU (Breuss, 2003B) and for the evaluation of the EU accession of Bulgaria and Romania (Breuss, 2010B) small macro integration models of a similar type as the present integration model were estimated to simulate the specific integration features of these countries. 14 The literature treats "regime changes" in the context of "Regime-Switching Models" with Markov chain econometrics (e.g., see Hamilton, 2008) . Generally, many economic time series occasionally exhibit dramatic breaks in their behaviour, associated with events such as financial or other crises. In our case the breaks occurred due to four integration shocks (1989, 1995, 1999 
Scenario 2: EU Membership in 1995
A new EU member must take over the acquis communautaire of the Single Market project.
This implies the communitisation, i.e. the transfer of competencies from former national responsibility to EU competence in many economic policy areas: the Common Agricultural Policy (the CAP), the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) by entering into the EU customs union), the common competition policy and a common regional/structural policy and many other areas where economic policy is harmonised at EU level.
In scenario 2 Austria's EU membership is captured by five inputs:
 More price competition: Entering into the Single Market increases price competitiveness which is captured by reducing the mark-up on costs 15 . We assume that the mark-up in case of Austria's EU membership has increased strong at the beginning and tapered off later (see Appendix B). The main result is that consumer prices decline, but the real GDP effects are negligible. 
Model results
The econometric estimation of the integration model for Austria (Appendix A) has been carried out with EViews 7.0 for the period 1960-2015. The main data source is the AMECO database by the European Commission inclusive latest forecast until 2015. Only the net migration data are provided from Statistik Austria.
Opening-up of Eastern Europe in 1989
The fall of the Iron Curtain was a windfall gift for the Austrian economy. This historic event provoked the already existing Habsburg or "k.u.k Monarchy" effect. Austria quickly used these new opportunities for trade and FDI. In the model simulations ( Figure 2 and Table 3) the opening-up resulted in an increase of real GDP of 0.2 percentage points per year. This created additional jobs and reduced unemployment. The current account position improved. Opening-up of Eastern Europe EU enlargement down. 12.000 jobs could be created per year, unemployment decreased considerably.
However, due to the confrontation with strong competitors from the old EU member states, the current account deteriorated. 
EMU Membership in 1999
In addition to EU membership, the participation in EMU and adoption of the euro added further 0.5 percentage points per year to real GDP.
Our results are similar but somewhat below those of McKinsey Germany (2012).
Accordingly, Austria benefitted the most from the Euro (7.8% more real GDP growth over a ten year period; or 0.8% per year), followed by Finland (6.7) and Germany (6.4) and the Netherlands (6.2%). The Euro zone has gained 3.6% in ten years. The McKinsey study evaluates four categories of Euro effects: i) reduction in transactions cost (low effects on GDP); ii) intra-Euro area trade effects; iii) competitiveness (this effect is high for Germany and also (as in our model) in Austria; it is negative for the soft-currency countries, like Italy) 
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and, iv) interest rate effect (this effect is low for Germany and Austria because the common interest rate of the Euro area was based on that of Germany; it was high for the countries with high pre-EMU interest rates, like Italy and other countries in the Euro area periphery).
EU enlargement in 2004/07
EU enlargement complemented the already ongoing advantage of the opening-up of Eastern Europe for Austria. Real GDP could be increased additionally by 0.2 percentage points per year. Most studies on EU enlargement find a 1:10 rule. That means that the welfare gains of the newcomers are ten times higher than those of the incumbent EU member states (see Breuss, 2002; similarly Levchenko and Zhang, 2012 17 ).
Overall effects of Austria's EU integration since 1989
Due to the processes of the opening-up of Eastern Europe, EU accession, EMU and EU enlargement running in parallel, the integration effects of the different stages partly overlap.
Hence, the various integration effects do not simply add up. All in all (see Table 3 The effects presented in Table 3 (cumulated and annual averages) blur to some extent the "true" profile of the integration effects calculated, by suggesting that the average growth effects cited would last permanently at that level. In reality, economic integration, i.e., the accession of a country to an integrated community (EU), gives rise to initial positive growth incentives (mainly due to a necessary adjustment and productivity shock) which gradually fade. We therefore observe, as a rule, "falling marginal returns" to integration. Even after the growth effects have faded away, the level of income (real GDP) has been raised cumulatively 
Conclusions
The euro area crisis has confronted the EU with new challenges. The previous governance architecture of EMU did not withstand the test of the crisis. To prevent the euro area from breaking up, the governance of EMU has being readjusted in order to be more resilient to future shocks. High on the agenda are the convergence of competitiveness among euro countries (monitored and steered by the new procedure for "excessive macroeconomic In any case, all historical studies on the reduction of public debt do not bode well for Europe in a medium-and longer-term perspective. All measure to slash government debt by means of fiscal austerity (expenditure cuts and tax increases, as foreseen by the Six-Pack and the Fiscal Compact) dampen medium-and long-term economic growth (see the extremely negative experience of Greece).
Due to these negative perspectives, the "growth dividend" that Austria enjoyed in the past, benefiting from its strong involvement in the Eastern European "emerging markets", may gradually wane. As already signalled by current medium-term projections, also the new member countries in Eastern Europe may move to a slower growth path, as they will be indirectly affected by the euro area crisis and the negative side effects of its resolution (notably the collective de-leveraging) and ad hoc break-out of political crises, like that in the Ukraine and the following tensions between the EU and Russia.
Nevertheless, the problem countries in the euro area periphery already show encouraging signs of an improving situation: the restoration of competitiveness is making progress, with current account imbalances diminishing. The understanding for the necessity to rein back the dynamics of government debt is growing. The unconventional intervention by the ECB is bearing fruit: interest rates on government debt have fallen markedly for the periphery countries and the euro is re-gaining strength vis-à-vis the US dollar. A recovery in the euro are is foreseen by most forecasters now. 
